RSI at 30.28 is NOT oversold; the true oversold signal already fired at 24.97 on October 7th with minimal bounce

• RSI at 30.28 is not oversold (oversold is below 30)
• On October 7th, RSI was 24.97 (below 30)
• Stock printed 20.75 intraday, then closed at 21.21
• Only 2% bounce followed on average volume, not a violent reversal
• ATR contracted from 0.94 to 0.59 (37% volatility compression)
• 44.4M volume spike—could be distribution, not accumulation

↩ rebuts: “Bull's RSI oversold bounce thesis”

P/E of 6.84× is misleading due to $10B+ one-time gain normalizing 2025 earnings; true normalized P/E is 7.5-8×

• P/E (TTM) of 6.84×
• TTM includes $10B+ one-time gain inflating 2025 number
• Current P/E on normalized earnings is closer to 7.5-8×

↩ rebuts: “Bull's 'cheap' P/E framing”

P/B of 0.84× is misleading because tangible book value is $58.7B NEGATIVE; most book value is goodwill that management has already written down $8.5B

• P/B of 0.84×
• Tangible book value is $58.7B NEGATIVE
• Most book value is goodwill, content libraries, and franchise rights with declining utility
• Goodwill fell $8.5B in a year
• P/B of 0.84× on overstated book value is actually closer to 1.0-1.2×

↩ rebuts: “Bull's 'below book' value thesis”

FCF Yield of 25.6% is inflated by 2025 working capital tailwinds; sustainable FCF yield is 15-18%

• FCF Yield of 25.6%
• $10B+ in working capital tailwinds from 2025
• Higher maintenance capex coming for DOCSIS 4.0
• Sustainable FCF yield is closer to 15-18%, not 25%

↩ rebuts: “Bull's 'exceptional FCF' framing”

6.3% dividend yield is a flashing yellow warning sign historically preceding dividend cuts or capital destruction (Verizon, AT&T history)

• Dividend Yield of 6.3%
• Stocks trade at 6%+ yields for two reasons: dividend cuts are priced in OR capital destruction is priced in
• Sub-1× P/B with massive debt and structural decline is not a mispricing—it's the right price for a melting ice cube

↩ rebuts: “Bull's 'income opportunity' framing”

Net debt of $89.5B vs normalized EBITDA of $32-34B puts leverage at 2.6-2.8×, at high end of peer range (2.0-2.5× for investment-grade peers)

• Net debt of $89.5B against EBITDA of ~$36B is 2.5× at reported level
• Normalized EBITDA is closer to $32-34B
• Net debt/EBITDA closer to 2.6-2.8×
• Investment-grade peers in cable/telecom trade at 2.0-2.5×
• Total debt fallen from $99B to $89B over 18 months (slow deleveraging pace)
• Interest coverage at 4.3× on trailing numbers (will compress with lower FCF)

↩ rebuts: “Bull's 'manageable debt' framing”

Single-notch credit downgrade (BBB to BBB-) would raise refinancing costs 50-100bps, costing $300-600M additional annual interest on $90B debt

• Single-notch downgrade (BBB to BBB-) would raise refinancing costs 50-100bps
• On $90B of debt over rolling 3-year refinancing cycle, that's $300-600M in additional annual interest
• This represents 1-2% of FCF gone to higher carry

↩ rebuts: “Bull's debt comfort thesis”

Fiber overbuild (Verizon Fios, AT&T, Frontier, Google Fiber) and T-Mobile FWA (5+ million subscribers) are accelerating broadband erosion—NOT priced in

• T-Mobile now has 5+ million fixed wireless subscribers, adding hundreds of thousands per quarter
• FWA targets the same middle-class household that Xfinity sells into, at a price point Comcast can't match
• FWA share is still in single digits but compounding
• Broadband ARPU growth is the only thing propping up connectivity segment—will stall when fiber enters markets

↩ rebuts: “Bull's 'decline is priced in' thesis”

DOCSIS 4.0 capex will push annual capex to $16-18B (vs $14B floor), compressing FCF meaningfully

• DOCSIS 4.0 capex is coming to defend broadband speeds against fiber and FWA
• $14B of annual capex is the floor, not the ceiling
• DOCSIS 4.0 push could push that to $16-18B annually

↩ rebuts: “Bull framing $14B capex as 'well covered by FCF'”

Goodwill impairments ($8.5B write-down) are management admitting they overpaid; Sky acquired for $40B in 2018 has been impaired repeatedly

• Sky was acquired for $40B in 2018
• Goodwill fell $8.5B in a year
• When a company writes down $8.5B of acquired assets, management is telling you they overpaid
• We're likely not done with impairments—Universal content assets and NBCU goodwill could face further write-downs
• Each impairment is a fresh admission that book value is overstated

↩ rebuts: “Bull's 'healthy mark-to-market' framing”

Management choosing debt paydown over buybacks at sub-book-value prices signals they think equity is overvalued or too risky to lever into

• At $21 with $25.31 book value per share, buybacks accrete $4 of book value per dollar spent
• Management is choosing debt paydown instead of buybacks because they don't want to lever up further in high-rate environment
• When insiders say 'we'd rather pay down 5% debt than repurchase at 6.8× earnings,' they're saying 'we don't think our stock is a compelling buy'

↩ rebuts: “Bull's 'disciplined capital allocation' framing”

Q1 2026 +3.77% YoY revenue growth is cherry-picked noise; Q2 2026 was -1.23% YoY—trend is flat-to-negative with quarterly chop

• Q1 2026 revenue grew +3.77% YoY
• Q2 2026 was down -1.23% YoY
• Revenue flat-to-negative for 3 years
• The trend is flat-to-negative revenue growth with quarterly chop—exactly what a slowly declining business looks like

↩ rebuts: “Bull citing Q1 2026 growth as trend reversal”

Downside scenarios project $15-18 stock (death cross continuation, subscriber erosion), versus limited upside to $24-26 (mean reversion against confirmed downtrend)

• Downside: continued subscriber erosion + ARPU stalling → multiple compression to 5-6× on $3 normalized EPS → $15-18 stock = -29% to -15%
• Downside: one-notch credit downgrade → $18 stock = -15%
• Downside: Q3 earnings miss + Peacock write-down guidance → $17-19 stock = -20% to -10%
• Downside: macro stress → $16-18 stock = -25% to -15%
• Upside: mean reversion to 50 SMA ($24.16) = +14%—but requires closing 12.2% gap against confirmed downtrend
• Upside: mean reversion to 200 SMA ($25.79) = +21%—but requires death cross to heal, historically takes 6-12 months
• Upside: multiple normalization to 9-10× = +70-89%—but requires structural concerns to resolve (contrary to secular decline thesis)

↩ rebuts: “Bull's asymmetric upside thesis”